2025-04-03T05:00:00Z

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WASHINGTON — In a significant policy shift, the U.S. government has instituted a ban on romantic or sexual relationships involving American government personnel in China. This directive extends not only to diplomats but also includes family members and contractors who possess security clearances. The Associated Press has obtained details regarding this confidential policy, which was implemented by the departing U.S. Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, in January prior to his departure from the position.

According to four individuals familiar with the matter, who requested to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the directive, this new policy is a comprehensive “non-fraternization” rule, marking a stark departure from historical practices. While some U.S. agencies have previously enforced strict regulations concerning such relationships, a publicized blanket ban of this nature has not been seen since the Cold War era. In many other countries, American diplomats often engage in romantic relationships with local citizens, and even marry them.

The new measure expands upon a more limited version of the policy enacted during the summer of the previous year, which specifically prohibited U.S. personnel from engaging in romantic or sexual relations with Chinese citizens employed as guards and support staff at the U.S. Embassy and five consulates across China. However, Burns's directive extends the restrictions to encompass all relationships with Chinese citizens, a move that came just days before President Donald Trump took office. Although the Associated Press has sought clarity, it remains uncertain how the policy precisely defines “romantic or sexual relationship.”

Concerns regarding insufficient restrictions on relationships between U.S. personnel and Chinese citizens were brought to light by members of Congress, prompting discussions about the necessity for stricter guidelines. The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party has yet to respond to inquiries regarding their stance on this policy.

This stringent new directive applies across all U.S. missions within mainland China, which includes the embassy located in Beijing and consulates situated in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Wuhan, as well as the American consulate in the semi-autonomous region of Hong Kong. Notably, the policy does not extend to U.S. personnel stationed outside of China. An exception has been made for those individuals who already have established relationships with Chinese citizens; they may apply for exemptions. In cases where an exemption request is denied, the individuals are required to either end the relationship or resign from their respective positions. Any personnel found violating the policy will face immediate expulsion from China.

Although this policy was communicated to American personnel in China both verbally and electronically in January, it has not been publicly announced. The State Department has stated that it does not comment on matters concerning internal protocols, while the National Security Council has redirected inquiries to the State Department. Burns has not responded to requests for comments sent to his email at The Cohen Group, a consultancy where he resumed his role as vice chair in February.

This recent prohibition is reminiscent of Cold War practices when intelligence services worldwide utilized attractive individuals to extract sensitive information, particularly during tense geopolitical climates. Historically, the State Department and other U.S. agencies operating in China have imposed rigorous reporting requirements concerning personal relationships for American personnel, particularly in countries recognized as significant intelligence threats, including Russia and Cuba. Declassified documents reveal that in 1987, the U.S. government enacted similar restrictions prohibiting personnel stationed in the Soviet bloc and China from forming personal relationships with locals, a measure initiated after a U.S. Marine was reportedly seduced by a Soviet spy.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, these restrictions were relaxed, and for many years, no such blanket ban existed in China. Up until this new directive, U.S. personnel in China were mandated to report any intimate interactions with Chinese citizens to their superiors, though they were not explicitly prohibited from engaging in romantic or sexual relationships.

In recent assessments, U.S. diplomats and intelligence experts have indicated that China continues to employ so-called “honeypots” to access confidential American information. During briefings prior to their assignments in China, U.S. personnel are informed about historical case studies wherein Chinese intelligence operatives have utilized attractive women to approach and seduce American diplomats. They are further cautioned that dozens of Chinese state security agents may be assigned to monitor diplomats who are regarded as potential targets.

While the operational specifics of U.S. government non-fraternization policies in other regions remain classified and largely undisclosed, the exact nature of these regulations remains unclear. Rising tensions between Washington and Beijing, particularly regarding trade, technology, and geopolitical rivalries, have contributed to tighter controls on diplomatic relations.

Peter Mattis, a former CIA analyst and president of The Jamestown Foundation, noted that there have been at least two widely reported instances in which Chinese agents have successfully seduced American diplomats stationed in China, although he has not encountered reports of such incidences in recent times. He emphasized that Chinese state security agencies do not solely rely on spies; rather, they often extract intelligence through coercion and intimidation of ordinary Chinese citizens. Consequently, any Chinese citizen who becomes romantically involved with an American diplomat could potentially become vulnerable to governmental pressure.

Mattis remarked, “The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is prepared to exploit any personal connection that a target has for intelligence gathering.” The institution's aggressive tactics suggest that they may have intensified efforts to infiltrate American diplomatic missions and the U.S. government as a whole. In response to inquiries regarding the ban, the Chinese foreign ministry declined to comment, indicating it would be more appropriate for the U.S. to address such questions. Additionally, China has been reinforcing its existing stringent regulations concerning its personnel stationed abroad, leading to policies that hinder the promotion of civil servants with spouses who hold foreign citizenship, as well as restrictions limiting diplomats' extended stays in any single country.

Furthermore, members of the Chinese military and police are generally not permitted to leave the country without explicit authorization from their superiors, demonstrating the extent to which China exercises control over its officials and staff in international contexts.

—Kang reported from Beijing.